Victory Giant Technology Company Overview

Victory Giant Technology (HuiZhou) Co., Ltd. is a PRC-incorporated, shareholder-owned printed-circuit-board manufacturer whose A shares trade on Shenzhen ChiNext as 300476 and H shares trade in Hong Kong as 2476/VGT. The legal entity grew from a Huizhou manufacturing predecessor into a multi-country group spanning rigid multilayer, HDI, flexible and rigid-flex PCB capabilities. Its formally stated purpose centers on pursuing opportunities and excellence, enabling customers and giving back to society; its current strategic direction is high-end, global and AI-oriented. Founder and chairman Chen Tao remains the controlling and de facto controller, while President Zhao Qixiang leads day-to-day execution. Revenue is generated by producing customized boards for technology, data-center, communications, automotive, industrial and other electronics customers, reached mainly through direct regional account teams and long-term qualification relationships. Growth now depends on converting advanced HDI and high-layer technical capability into qualified volume while ramping factories across Asia without losing yield, delivery discipline or cost control. This boundary covers the listed company and consolidated subsidiaries through August 15, 2026, not unrelated suppliers, customers or similarly named entities. 2026 first-quarter filing and official company profile.

The group story starts with Shenghua Electronics in 2003, while the legal predecessor of today’s listed company was established in Huizhou in 2006. Subsequent consolidation, joint-stock conversion, public listings and overseas acquisitions progressively added capital access, flexible-circuit capability and manufacturing locations without changing the core identity as a PCB producer.

That distinction matters because “founding” can refer to the earlier operating group or to the present legal entity. The Hong Kong listing document traces Shenghua Electronics to January 2003 and Victory Giant Technology’s predecessor to July 2006; the latter is the cleaner legal origin for the company now carrying the listed name.

History is grounded in the Hong Kong listing document and the company’s official history.

The sequence also explains the current product breadth. The 2023 transaction brought MFS flexible-circuit operations into a group historically stronger in rigid multilayer and HDI boards; the Thailand acquisition and later Vietnam buildout shifted the operating footprint toward regional production that can support customers seeking manufacturing outside mainland China.

Victory Giant explicitly labels its mission around seizing opportunities, pursuing excellence, enabling customers and giving back to society, and its vision around customer satisfaction, innovation and leading industry development. Its stated core values emphasize dedication, integrity and responsibility, creating a purpose framework that links customer outcomes with technical ambition and organizational discipline.

The company’s 2025 annual report does more than state these ideas. It connects them to a 2026 operating agenda: deepen high-end PCB R&D, strengthen global capacity coordination, improve full-process quality, give core customers one-to-one service and build technical and manufacturing talent. Those actions are evidence of how management interprets the purpose, rather than proof that every aspiration has already been achieved.

There is also a clear strategic layer separate from mission and vision. Management describes “Embrace AI, run toward the future” as its core development concept and prioritizes AI computing and data centers while pursuing high-end, global and diversified development. That positioning narrows the near-term operating focus without replacing the broader corporate mission. 2025 annual report.

The values have practical tension as well. Fast capacity expansion can support customer responsiveness, but it also raises the burden on qualification, training, quality systems and capital discipline. A purpose centered on customers and responsibility therefore becomes most credible when new plants reach stable yield and delivery performance rather than when construction alone is completed.

Victory Giant is legally owned by its shareholders through ordinary A and H shares, but public ownership does not imply dispersed control. Founder-chairman Chen Tao remains identified by the company as controlling shareholder and de facto controller, with control reinforced through investment vehicles and concert-party relationships involving family-linked holdings.

At the March 31, 2026 A-share register snapshot, Shenzhen Shenghua Xinye Investment and Victory Giant Technology Group (Hong Kong) together held 266,269,191 A shares and were reported as acting in concert. After the April H-share offering and full over-allotment, the company’s total share capital was stated as 982,784,813 shares in a July 2026 announcement. Those dates matter because the H-share issuance changed percentage ownership even when existing A-share counts were unchanged.

Who owns the economic rights?

A- and H-share investors own ordinary shares in the listed company. The two share classes form the equity base, while market venue does not itself confer corporate ownership or operational control.

Who holds final control?

Chen Tao is the company-identified controlling and de facto controller. His influence is exercised through chairmanship and family-linked investment vehicles, while management authority is separately delegated to the president and senior team.

Ownership mechanics are supported by the audited annual report and the July 2026 HKEX announcement.

The governance implication is concentration without managerial equivalence. Chen chairs the board and retains final control, but Zhao Qixiang serves as president and is responsible for business and daily operations. The 2025 annual report also states that business, personnel, assets, institutions and finance operate independently from the controlling shareholder and actual controller, a governance safeguard that should be evaluated separately from ownership concentration.

High-build-up HDI and very high-layer boards are central because they combine demanding design rules with repeated manufacturing cycles, precision drilling, plating, alignment, signal-integrity control and yield management. Victory Giant has oriented R&D, equipment, inspection and capacity planning toward these processes as AI accelerators, servers and networking hardware require denser interconnects.

The technical challenge is cumulative. Each additional HDI build-up cycle can add lamination steps and microvia complexity; higher layer counts increase registration, impedance and thermal-management demands. That means capability is not just a maximum-layer specification. It depends on repeatable process control, qualified materials, test equipment, engineering feedback and stable mass-production yield.

What capability boundary has Victory Giant stated?

Company disclosures position the manufacturing edge around advanced multilayer and HDI structures already in production capability, with another HDI generation still moving through research and customer qualification.

• More than 100-layer high-multilayer PCB manufacturing capability.
• 10-build 30-layer HDI and 16-layer any-layer HDI capability.
• 14-build 36-layer HDI under research and certification in July 2026.
• AI-assisted inspection deployed across process inspection stations.

Technical capability descriptions come from the July 2026 investor record and manufacturing-process context from the listing document.

These are company-reported capabilities, not independent benchmarks of yield or customer qualification. Their economic significance comes from enabling boards with greater interconnect density and complexity, but each design must still pass the customer’s engineering, audit and reliability gates before it becomes sustained production revenue.

The operating model converts customer-specific electrical and mechanical requirements into qualified, manufactured boards sold through purchase orders. Inputs include engineered laminates and copper-based materials, capital-intensive equipment, process know-how and labor; value is created through design-for-manufacture support, fabrication, testing, quality assurance, delivery and responsive engineering service.

Major customers generally operate under framework agreements lasting one to two years, with actual price and volume established in individual purchase orders and risk transferring after customer acceptance. Economically, this is a manufacturing-and-sales model rather than a subscription model: revenue depends on winning designs, securing purchase orders, producing at required yield and delivering accepted boards.

The process and commercial handoffs are described in the Hong Kong listing document.

The cost structure shows why material sourcing and manufacturing discipline matter. Copper-clad laminates, prepregs, copper foil and related materials feed a process with significant equipment and overhead requirements; price movements can reach margins before negotiated selling prices adjust. Quality failures are similarly expensive because complex boards consume multiple process steps before final acceptance.

Dependencies therefore sit on both sides of the factory. Upstream, the company needs qualified materials, equipment, energy and technical labor; downstream, it needs customer qualification, stable order schedules and acceptance. Its scale can spread fixed costs, but large factories also make utilization, mix and ramp execution consequential to economics.

Victory Giant serves enterprise electronics programs rather than a mass consumer audience. Hardware engineering, quality and procurement teams typically shape supplier choice; purchasing organizations pay for qualified boards; and the ultimate beneficiaries are the data-center, vehicle, communications, industrial, medical and device systems into which those boards are integrated.

The served applications are broad, but the current commercial emphasis is narrower: AI computing, data centers, high-speed communications and advanced automotive programs. The company’s listing materials describe more than 700 customers during each track-record period and 12 regional sales and customer-service teams covering major markets including China, the United States, Japan, Europe and South Korea.

Physical distribution follows the same enterprise model: finished boards are typically held at production-center warehouses and delivered mainly through third-party logistics providers to customer-specified locations, with service providers reviewed periodically. The go-to-market is therefore technical and account-based rather than consumer-advertising-led. distribution and logistics disclosure.

Retention is therefore engineering-led as much as sales-led. The 2026 strategy introduces a “chief service officer” mechanism for core customers and emphasizes support from engineering design through shipment. The more complex the board and the longer the qualification path, the more valuable responsive technical service becomes alongside unit price and delivery reliability.

Customer concentration is a material constraint on that model. In 2025, the top five customers represented 41.98% of annual sales, with the largest at 14.97%. The identities are anonymized in the filing, so the decision-useful conclusion is concentration exposure itself: major account wins can accelerate growth, while program changes at large customers can also affect factory loading.

The relevant competitive boundary is a qualified sourcing decision for advanced multilayer or HDI boards used in high-speed computing, networking, communications and other demanding electronics. Victory Giant faces direct overlap from global PCB manufacturers with comparable high-layer or HDI capability and partial substitution from suppliers integrating more interconnect function into substrates or modules.

Competition is program-specific. A supplier may overlap technically yet lack the right approved site, geography, capacity window, material set or customer qualification for a particular order. Conversely, a vendor with broader capabilities can compete selectively on the most demanding designs while serving very different end markets elsewhere.

Public capability pages cannot establish customer-by-customer win rates, effective pricing or qualification parity. The safest comparison is therefore functional: all four named manufacturers participate in high-density or high-speed interconnect, but the exact competitive set narrows only after a buyer specifies board architecture, reliability, geography, certification, volume and delivery requirements.

The main growth engines are higher-value product mix, deeper design participation with large technology customers and additional high-end capacity. The Hong Kong listing broadened capital-market access, but operating growth still requires qualified demand, reliable yield and equipment-heavy factory ramps; capital availability cannot substitute for successful technology transfer and customer approval.

Growth priorities are set out in the 2025 annual report and updated in the July 2026 investor record.

Management’s long-range goal is a 2030 output-value target of RMB100 billion, which should be treated as a company target rather than a forecast. The current buildout is substantial: in Q1 2026, net cash used in investing activities was RMB4.178 billion, with the company attributing the increase mainly to purchase and construction of long-term assets. July target and capacity update.

The constraints are equally concrete. New capacity depends on equipment delivery, commissioning, customer audits, samples, order placement and gradual yield release. Financing also matters because the expansion is capital intensive; Q1 disclosures show higher borrowings alongside investment spending. Management therefore has to pace construction against real customer demand rather than treat installed square meters as finished economic capacity.

Victory Giant is moving from a predominantly China-centered manufacturing base toward a distributed Asian footprint. Thailand and Malaysia already form part of existing capacity, while Vietnam is a current expansion project. The strategic purpose is customer-localized production, regional delivery resilience and additional high-end capacity, not a replacement of the large Huizhou manufacturing base.

The disclosed September 2025 production-center footprint still showed Huizhou as the dominant physical site, with smaller centers in Hunan, Thailand and Malaysia. That scale pattern explains why overseas expansion changes flexibility faster than it changes the group’s center of gravity: process know-how and volume remain heavily anchored in established Chinese operations.

By July 2026, company materials described existing capacity across Guangdong, Hunan, Thailand and Malaysia, with Huizhou, Thailand, Vietnam and Malaysia projects contributing to future ramp. Vietnam and the newer Thailand facilities still required construction, equipment tuning, audits and qualification before full production release. July 2026 capacity update.

Geographic diversification brings new dependencies. Overseas sites can help customers localize supply, but the company itself notes that overseas factory preparation takes longer than domestic builds. Experienced engineering teams must transfer processes, local workforces must be trained, suppliers and logistics must meet specifications, and customers must approve the exact manufacturing site.

Chen Tao is chairman and executive director, while Zhao Qixiang is president and executive director with responsibility for business and daily operations. That separation places strategic board leadership with the founder-controller and operating execution with the president, supported by executives responsible for sales, production, technology, quality, finance and governance.

As of July 20, 2026, the board comprised four executive directors, one non-executive director and four independent non-executive directors. Chen chaired the board; Zhao, Chen Yong and Wang Haiyan were the other executives; Liu Chunlan was non-executive; and four independent directors provided the formally independent board layer.

Governance should not be conflated with management. Independent directors and board committees provide formal oversight, while senior management runs the business. Founder control means the chair has substantial influence over strategic direction, but the operational organization is broader than one individual and includes specialized executives with long tenures in PCB manufacturing and corporate functions.

Succession risk is therefore partly mitigated by delegated roles but not eliminated. Chen remains both founder-controller and chair, making his strategic influence material. At the same time, Zhao’s presidency since 2024 and the expanded senior-management structure indicate an operating model designed to execute across multiple plants and geographies rather than depend on the chairman for every daily decision.

Victory Giant today is best understood as a founder-controlled, dual-listed advanced PCB manufacturer whose current story is the simultaneous scaling of technical complexity and geographic reach. Its opportunity comes from converting high-end interconnect capability into qualified customer programs; its execution burden comes from doing that across capital-intensive factories with disciplined quality and service.

What is the core engine?

Complex multilayer and HDI manufacturing is the central economic engine, because engineering depth, process control and qualified production translate demanding customer designs into saleable, repeatable boards.

Why can the model endure?

Early technical collaboration, direct account coverage, manufacturing scale and multi-country capacity reinforce one another when customers qualify the company into long-lived electronics programs.

Which balance is hardest?

Management must balance speed with yield, customer concentration with diversification, and aggressive capacity investment with funding, material, qualification and geopolitical constraints across the supply chain.

This synthesis connects evidence from the 2025 annual report.

The defining test is not whether Victory Giant can announce more technology or capacity. It is whether the company can repeatedly turn advanced designs, global manufacturing assets and major-account relationships into accepted products, cash-generating production and dependable delivery while preserving governance, quality and capital discipline at a much larger operating scale.